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The Development of Large Scale Enterprise in Australia, 1910-641
SIMON VILLE and D.T. MERRETT
Australian National University and University of Melbourne
Research about the rise of large scale enterprise has concentrated on 
the world’s leading industrial economies particularly the United States, 
Britain, Germany, France, and Japan.2  By way of contrast, this article studies 
the evolution of large business enterprises in an economy at the ‘periphery’ of 
the world’s economic system rather than at the ‘centre’. Australia has been an 
outlier from the major industrial economies in many respects. Its integration 
into the international economy was facilitated by the new technologies of 
transport and communications, notably the steamship, railway, and electric 
cable, that provided the preconditions for the rise of large scale industrial 
enterprises in the United States and later in Western Europe and Japan. 
Providing raw materials and foodstuffs to the industrial economies allowed 
Australia to enjoy one of the highest per capita incomes in the world at the 
end of the nineteenth century. The economy became industrialised in the first 
half of the twentieth century, a process of import substitution that owed 
much to rising trade barriers. Thus protected, Australian-domiciled industrial 
firms faced lessened competition from the successful first movers of the 
capital intensive and science-based industries of the United States and 
Western Europe. Increasingly foreign firms sought access to the Australian 
market by means of foreign direct investment.
This study explores the rise of large scale enterprise in the context of a 
transformation from an extremely wealthy resource-based economy to a 
sluggishly performing industrialised economy by mid-century.3 The 
Australian case therefore provides a further but quite distinct testing ground 
for the Chandleresque-interpretation of the emergence of large scale 
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enterprise. The paper addresses a series of questions central to the existing 
literature.  When and where did large business enterprises begin? Did big 
business already exist in the resource and service sector before the rise of 
large industrial firms? What factors facilitated the emergence and continued 
expansion of firms? Did the first movers remain industry leaders? Did firms
grow through the pursuit of sequential strategies of accumulating resources, 
rationalisation of production or distribution processes, vertical integration 
and later by diversification into new markets and product lines? To what 
extent did Australia’s corporate giants behave in a way that corresponded to 
competitive capitalism? How effective were Australian managers in building 
corporate capabilities that would provide competitive advantages in domestic 
and international markets?
The paper provides a foundation stone for a more comprehensive 
investigation of big business in twentieth-century Australia. It identifies the 
100 largest non-financial firms operating in Australia at various dates from 
1910 up to 1964. The methodology employed to construct the data is 
discussed in the next section. The data of firms classified by industry and 
country of origin is reviewed in section 3. The question of whether Australian 
large scale enterprise approximated the competitive capitalism of the United 
States or the family capitalism of Britain is discussed in section 4. The vigour 
with which Australian firms sought to create corporate capabilities is 
examined in section 5. A brief conclusion brings the paper to a close.
II
There are many criteria for measuring the relative size of firms 
including assets, output, sales, paid up and market value of capital, or labour 
force. None provide an unambiguous measure of size. For example, 
enumeration by workforce size can be misleading for cross-industry 
comparisons where different capital-labour requirements exist.  Output or 
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sales figures are only helpful where they can distinguish value added.  
Capitalisation is often preferred although complications arise over whether to 
include loan capital.4  Equity capitalisation represents aggregate ownership 
claims on the company and is most accurate where it gives market rather than 
book values. However, exogenous factors driving equity markets can 
introduce an element of volatility that would not be reflected in other 
measures such as assets, sales or workforce numbers. Furthermore, this 
indicator is inappropriate for firms whose shares are not listed or are rarely 
traded. Asset measurement is not without its shortcomings. In particular, it 
relies upon consistent accounting and disclosure practices on balance sheets 
and in some sectors, notably finance, can produce an inflated picture of size 
through loan policies which have made the company asset rich.5 While 
capitalisation and assets are the preferred forms of measurement, the 
relationship between the two is not always uniform.6
Historical measurements of changes in firm size encounter significant 
data collection problems.  Since the archives of only a small percentage of 
firms are extant, summary published data, usually annual financial reports, 
must be used.  Before 1945 this rarely included information on company 
workforces or value added in production.  Most scholars, therefore, have 
used capitalisation or assets data.  The paucity of balance sheet evidence for 
British companies has encouraged writers to concentrate upon capitalisation. 
Payne calculated nominal equity values together with mortgages and 
debentures.  Hannah and Wardley each used equity market values together 
with debentures.  Schmitz also used equity market values in comparing 
nations but substituted assets where data was not extant.  Chandler used 
assets for German and American companies while Fruin has provided a 
range of assets, capital values, and sales data for Japanese firms.  The use of 
different methodologies means that figures on absolute firm size must be 
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analysed circumspectly although the broad parameters for comparison 
remain valid.  
In analysing Australian firms asset size has been adopted as the unit of 
measurement. A monetary value of a firm’s assets is the most readily 
available data across the time period under consideration. Incorporation of 
businesses became increasingly common from the late nineteenth century. 
Company law required the publication of balance sheet and a profit and loss 
account. The asset approach has enabled the inclusion where possible of those 
firms whose shares were unquoted or rarely traded. The accuracy of share 
capitalisation as a form of measurement of firm size, especially in the early 
years, is compromised by the belated development of Australian stock 
markets and firms’ heavy reliance on bank debt. Studies for other nations 
using the capitalisaton methodology have been forced to exclude those firms 
that were incorporated as private rather than public companies or whose 
shares were seldom traded because of the difficulties of measurement.7
Australia has always attracted a good deal of inward foreign 
investment. This has taken the form of both ‘free standing’ companies, those 
who earned revenues from business activities in Australia but had no 
operational counterpart in the country of ownership, principally in Britain, 
and, more recently, local subsidiaries of ‘classic’ foreign owned and operated 
multinationals.8 While frequently not quoted on the Australian stock 
exchange these firms were often amongst the largest in the country. 
Therefore, in contrast to studies of some of the larger and more self-contained 
economies, assets of ‘free standing’ companies and subsidiaries of 
multinationals will be included where they can be identified. However, 
measurement and data problems arise from their inclusion. The assets of ‘free 
standing’ firms could be taken to approximate their ‘size’ in Australia as that 
was the locus of their business activities. Greater problems arise in singling 
out the Australian assets of subsidiaries of multinational enterprises 
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particularly as such data usually resides in firm archives rather than the 
public domain. For instance, there is no record of the assets employed by 
either Lever Brothers Limited (Australia) or the Shell Company of Australia 
in the range of sources used to generate our lists before 1964. However, the 
capital employed by Lever Brothers and Shell would have placed them at 
number 26 and 40 respectively in the list of the 100 largest companies in 
1930.9
Consistent with previous studies, government enterprise and non-
profit-making and voluntary organisations are excluded from the main data 
sets because of insufficient information.  Nonetheless, the state was a major 
force in the economy and its multivarious activities have been described by 
the term ‘colonial socialism’.10 Australian governments behaved as 
developmental agencies from the 1860s until the 1930s. Australian 
governments had accessed the London capital market since the mid-
nineteenth century to finance the building of the transport and 
communications infrastructure necessary to open up the continent and to link 
Australia to the rest of the world. The government continued to operate the 
railways, mail, and telegraph systems. Their activities in the twentieth 
century extended to taking over the production and distribution of gas and 
electricity from private sector operators. The state ran its own banks and 
insurance businesses in competition with private enterprise. Declining 
commodity prices in the inter war period led to the establishment of a range 
of statutory marketing bodies with monopoly powers in commodities such as 
dairy products, raisins, meat and wheat. Some government run businesses, 
particularly the railways and post office, had workforces far larger than those 
of any private sector firm up until the 1970s.11
Most previous studies of the growth of big business have concentrated 
upon firms in manufacturing and extraction sectors.12 Given the nature of 
economic development in Australia the current investigation includes firms 
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from all sectors of the economy other than finance. The credit creation 
function of banks, and other financial institutions, significantly inflates their 
asset figures.13  Using capitalisation figures reduces somewhat the apparent 
dominance of finance although the problems associated with this form of 
measurement have been discussed above.14 Manufacturing in Australia has 
been less significant than in many other advanced nations, particularly before 
WWII, and therefore the picture would be particularly distorted if 
pastoralism, mining and the service industries were excluded from an 
analysis of large scale enterprise.
The sources of information about firms’ assets used in the study varied 
between different years.  The Australasian Insurance and Banking Record, 
published annually from 1877, was used for pre-WWI years and provides 
summary balance sheet data of firms listed on Australian or the London stock 
exchange. By the interwar period data was taken from the Jobson’s Investment 
Digest of Australia and New Zealand, (‘Jobson’s’) an annual publication 
compiled by Alex Jobson from 1920 and including, ‘a summary of all 
Australian company reports published...up to the latest moment’.15 In the 
post-WWII period Jobson’s became less comprehensive and was replaced by 
the more complete coverage of the Official Melbourne Stock Exchange Record.  
This source was supplemented by reference to an occasional publication 
known as the Delfin Digest of the Top Companies in Australia, New Zealand and 
South East Asia, which ranked companies according to various criteria 
including shareholder funds, paid up capital, assets, profits, and employees. 
These sources have been compared with each other where overlap exists and 
additional information about the nature of individual firms has been obtained 
from a miscellany of supplementary references.16 The sources capture firms 
complying with the disclosure requirements of Australian company laws and 
stock exchanges. Foreign firms operating in Australia are included in these 
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lists, although none of the sources indicates clearly the basis on which these 
firms have been selected.17
In order to benchmark the changes in the population of the largest 
firms occurring through the twentieth century four years have been 
investigated each about a generation apart, notably 1910, 1930, 1952, and 
1964.  The years 1930 and 1952 had previously been analysed in an 
unpublished thesis. That data provided an initial comparator against which 
to work: where discrepancies emerged it was possible to re-check the 
sources.18 The inclusion of 1910 has extended the study of big business back 
close to its earliest years while carrying the investigation forward to 1964 
permits an observation of the impact of the rapid growth in the relative 
importance of manufacturing in the economy. 
These dates not only track the profound changes in the structure of the 
Australian economy as it industrialised but they allow comparisons with 
similar studies done for other countries. The chosen years for Australia are 
proximate to those used for other countries including the global comparisons 
of Schmitz for 1912 and 1937, and the country studies of Chandler for United 
States, Britain and Germany, Taylor and Baskerville for Canada, Levy-
Leboyer for France, Fruin for Japan and Hannah and Wardley for Britain.
Data on the principal activities of firms included in the lists has been 
drawn from a variety of sources. In some cases the name implies function. 
Often firms self described the nature of their business in prospectuses or 
annual reports to shareholders. Additional material can be gleaned from 
stockbrokers’ advice to their clients and commissioned company histories. 
Such information has been used to allocate firms into ‘industries’ at the two-
digit level in accordance with the Australian Standard Industrial 
Classification first adopted in 1969. The industry classification involved a 
number of somewhat arbitrary decisions, especially for the earlier years, for 
firms that where already diversified or vertically integrated.
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The quality of the data in the 1910 and 1930 lists is the most 
problematic. The key issue in 1910 is the limited amount of information that is 
extant. Many large firms were still trading as partnerships or had registered 
as private companies. Others were in the process of converting to public 
company status. In order to counter this truncation problem the time frame 
for data collection of asset values has been extended to 1915 as long as the 
company existed in the same form at 1910.  There remain one or two 
unresolved individual cases that are mostly small outliers, although David 
Jones, the Sydney retailer, for whom no financial records can be found would 
probably have been in the top fifty.  These individual cases will be pursued as 
the research proceeds in greater detail.  The crux of the problem regarding the 
1930 list, as indicated above, is that our records do not capture all of the many 
foreign firms that entered Australia in the 1920s.19 Closer to the present, 
information on companies both local and foreign becomes more extensive but 
its interpretation is more difficult because of the increasing numbers of 
complex business organisations involving holding companies, subsidiaries, 
and joint venture arrangements. Consolidated accounts were rare before the 
1950s. Rudimentary adjustments have been made to asset values of the parent 
in those circumstances where consolidation seemed appropriate to avoid 
double counting. As our research progresses further it may be possible to 
calculate a fuller financial reconstruction.20
III
The lists ranking the 100 largest non-financial firms in terms of asset 
values for the years 1910, 1930, 1952 and 1964 can be found in the appendix to 
this paper. A number of salient features are evident that will be discussed in 
more detail below. First, large scale enterprise existed before the 
industrialisation of the Australian economy from the 1920s onwards. The 
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1930, 1952 and 1964 lists confirm the subsequent ascendancy of 
manufacturing as the centre of large scale non-financial firms. Second, large 
scale firms within manufacturing increasingly clustered in the capital 
intensive and science based industries. Third, foreign owned firms are 
amongst the largest of the large scale firms throughout the whole period 
under consideration despite the data deficiencies discussed above. The 
nationality of those firms shifts from Britain in 1910 and 1930 increasingly 
towards the United States of America.
In 1910 nine of the top ten firms were located in the resource and 
related service industries including seven pastoral agencies. Only one 
manufacturer, the sugar refiner Colonial Sugar Refinery, was included. The 
importance of firms serving the pastoral and mining industries reflected the 
structure of the economy and its connectedness with the international 
commodity markets. By the end of the nineteenth century the Australian 
economy was dominated, directly and indirectly, by its resource using 
industries and a range of service industries that provided intermediate inputs 
into the production and distribution of those commodities which included 
merchanting, storing, insuring, marketing, financing, and transporting. The 
pastoral, agricultural, dairying and mining industries generated 30 per cent of 
GDP in 1901.21 Mining, both gold and base metals, became more capital 
intensive as ore bodies were exploited at greater depths. This industry also 
became more reliant on expert geologists, surveyors, chemists, assayers, 
engineers and financiers. Merchants and financiers handled a flow of 
products from the farm gate to the textile mills of Bradford, and back from 
foreign manufacturers to Australian retailers. Importers, located in the 
principal ports, had larger businesses than the retailers they served. Those 
sectors of the economy providing services to the export and import trades -
government services, finance, distribution and other services - made up more 
than a third of GDP. 
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By contrast, domestic manufacture was mostly small scale and 
technologically primitive at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
Manufacturing contributed only 12 per cent of GDP in 1901. It was 
concentrated in those industries where bulky low value goods such as 
building materials had a degree of protection from import competition, or in 
areas such as newspaper printing, or the processing of perishable foodstuffs. 
However, the seeds of change were evident even then as continuous process 
technology was being applied in industries such as flour milling, brewing, 
distilling, confectionary, dairy products and primary metals before the turn of 
the century. 
By the seventh decade of the twentieth century the structure of the 
Australian economy had undergone great change. Agriculture and mining’s 
share of GDP had fallen to less than ten per cent. Manufacturing had emerged 
as the largest sector of the economy and now generated 26 per cent of GDP.  
By 1964 there was only one pastoral company in the top ten; six others 
remained resource-based (petroleum, mining, and sugar) but their 
connections were with the industrial rather than agricultural sector.
Table 1 about here
The primary ASIC categories confirm this shifting sectoral distribution 
among Australia’s top one hundred firms (Table 1).  In 1910 the top 100 firms 
were spread quite widely over wholesale/retail, mining, transport, and 
manufacturing. Thenceforth, there was relative decline in all of the principal 
sectors except for manufacturing whose share of assets rises from 25 per cent 
in 1910 to 71 per cent by 1964. Most of the largest private sector firms were by 
1964 located in the science based and capital intensive industries of the 
second industrial revolution - electrical engineering, chemicals, petroleum 
refining, rubber, plastics, machinery, automobiles, and primary metals.22
Table 2 about here
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Australian experience in manufacturing differs from that of more 
advanced industrial economies in two respects. First, the importance of 
manufacturing industry amongst the top 100 Australian firms peaks decades 
later than was the case in Britain.23  However, Taylor and Baskerville’s study 
reveals a similar rising share for manufacturing amongst the leading thirty 
Canadian corporations.24 Second, studies of big business in other nations have 
emphasised the importance of the food and tobacco, textiles, chemicals, 
petroleum, metals, machinery, and transport equipment industries as the 
location of most of the largest industrial firms (Table 2).  These consumer 
goods and heavy industries were particularly affected by the technological 
and market imperatives that were driving the growth of scale in 
manufacturing industry.  Data in table 3 shows that these industries were also 
dominant in Australia although with a somewhat greater contribution of less 
technologically complex industries such as clay, concrete, paper and leather 
products. Australia’s largest manufacturing firms were primarily located in 
the ‘consumer goods’ industries in the early decades of the century but their 
relative importance declined over time giving way to the ‘heavy industries’. 
However, this latter group never came to approach the importance it held in 
the economies of the United States, Germany and Japan. 
Table 3 about here
Foreign direct investment was evident in many parts of the economy 
including the banking, insurance, mining, pastoral, and timber industries, 
and increasingly after WW1, in many parts of manufacturing.25  Summary 
data from the lists of the largest 100 firms indicates the weight of foreign 
firms. In 1910 ‘free standing’ foreign firms and subsidiaries of foreign 
multinationals make up nearly a third of the top 100 firms and comprise 
nearly a half of all assets. The share of foreign firms and their assets falls 
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sharply in 1930 and 1952. By 1965 this trend had been reversed when the 
importance of foreign firms approximates what it had been in 1910. The fall 
and subsequent rise in the importance of foreign firms reflects a number of 
factors. The growth of the market and government protection of 
manufacturing provided opportunities for the emergence of large domestic 
firms. Some of the ‘free standing firms’, particularly the pastoral firms, 
transfer their domicile to Australia. However, there are strong reasons for 
believing that our data does not fully capture the influx of subsidiaries of 
multinationals after WW1.
 Australia stood apart from the industrial economies of the northern 
hemisphere in terms of absolute size as well as its structure. Its population 
and domestic markets were only a fraction of the size of those of the leading 
economies. For example, the largest company in each of the four years 
analysed was Dalgety (1910), Colonial Sugar Refining (1930), and Broken Hill 
Proprietary (1952 and 1964).  In each case the leading firm was at least 20 per 
cent larger than its nearest domestic rival but compared poorly with 
dominant firms in other nations.  Thus Dalgety’s £8m of assets in 1910 puts it 
well down the list of the world’s top hundred industrial firms for 1912 at 
62nd and the second largest firm, British Tobacco (Australia) would only just 
have got in the list at 99.26  Colonial Sugar Refining’s assets in 1930 would not 
have brought it close to the top fifty industrials globally for 1937 and it was 
only one-sixtieth the size of America’s top industrial company of 1930, US 
Steel. By 1952 Australia’s BHP possessed little more than a thirtieth of the 
assets of America’s Standard Oil (New Jersey) four years earlier.27 In Canada, 
which might be a more appropriate comparator, the largest non-financial 
corporation in 1929 after Canadian Pacific Railway was International Paper 
which was nearly six times larger than Colonial Sugar Refining.  The 
diminutive nature of Australian corporations is likewise reflected in a 
comparison with the top 25 in the United States: the aggregate assets of the 
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Australian firms representing only 3, 3.6, and 4 per cent of their American 
counterparts for the years 1910/17, 1930, and 1948/52.
Table 4 about here
Within the Australian market, however, the top 25 large scale 
enterprises were relatively more important than in a number of other major 
economies. If we follow Schmitz’s approach of comparing the size of the 
leading 25 firms with the level of national income we find that these 
corporations occupied a more dominant position in Australia (Table 4).  The 
assets of the leading 25 industrial firms in America and Japan accounted for 
ten per cent of GDP in 1917 and 1918 respectively compared with nine per 
cent for Germany in 1912 but 19 per cent in Australia in 1910. In 1930 the 
respective figures for America and Japan were 19 and 17 per cent with 10 per 
cent for Germany in 1937. Australia remained ahead with 21 per cent in 1930.  
For Britain we have market capitalisation figures of 11 and 28 per cent 
respectively for 1912 and 1937.28  Dominance fell slightly in Australia after 
WWII to 16 per cent in 1952 although the US figure was also down to 11 per 
cent in 1948.  The importance of big business in Australia then rose sharply to 
26 per cent of GDP by 1964.
An alternative measure of the importance of large scale enterprise to 
the Australian economy is to examine the size distribution within the largest 
100 firms. A comparison of the ratio of the aggregate asset value of the 
bottom five firms to the top five indicates the gap between the smallest and 
largest. In 1910 the ratio was 0.039, a figure reflecting the dominance of 
foreign pastoral companies in an immature corporate economy. The ratios 
were 0.094 in 1930, 0.074 in 1952 and 0.068 in 1964.  Thus, the dominance of 
the five largest firms was highest in 1910, fell through to 1930, before rising 
gradually up to 1964. The rising importance of the assets of five smallest firms 
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between 1930 and 1964 reflect the maturing of the corporate economy with 
the emergence of greater numbers of large corporations.29 This broadening 
base of large scale enterprises, especially in manufacturing, is reflected in 
high levels of concentration in many industries. Oligopolies and monopolies 
were evident in sugar refining, brewing, shipping, banking and wool broking 
even before WWI.30
IV
A key question is whether the rise of large scale enterprise in Australia, 
that was located increasingly in manufacturing, provided the basis for what 
Chandler has called ‘competitive managerial capitalism’.31  Chandler sought 
to explain the rapid expansion of the American economy from the second half 
of the nineteenth century in terms of the leading role of efficient large scale 
enterprises which invested in production, marketing, and management.  
Production and marketing innovations yielded economies of scale and scope, 
and internalisation of coordination potentially lowered transactions costs.  
Firms sustained these benefits by investing in organisational capabilities such 
as rationalised management structures to effect decision-making and research 
infrastructures to develop new processes and products.  German firms 
followed the three-pronged investment but the legality of cartels encouraged 
more inter-firm collusion rather than outright mergers. This ‘cooperative 
managerial capitalism’ is, nonetheless, viewed as preferable to Britain’s 
‘personal capitalism’ where firms failed to invest in trained managers and 
rational administrative structures.  The timing of Australian industrialisation 
differed from that of the USA and these other high income economies, 
lagging behind by many decades, but how does the performance of its 
leading firms fit with the alternative typologies identified by Chandler?  In 
this section we will look at the external operating conditions faced by 
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Australian firms and in the next at the extent of their internal investments in 
corporate capabilities.
By the mid-twentieth century Australia possessed an economy in 
which a number of key industries were dominated by large enterprises 
although this had not led to marked improvements in efficiencies relative to 
those of firms in similar industries overseas. Australian manufacturing 
industry was not internationally competitive and continued to rely on the 
highest trade barriers for protection in the industrial economies.32
Improvements in efficiency were constrained by powerful inertia in the 
institutional structure of the Australian economy which shaped the response 
of business to the opportunities afforded by new technologies.  Australian 
business was a prisoner of path dependency. The business skills, 
technologies, and organisational structures that served the wealthy 
mercantile economy of nineteenth-century Australia did not lend themselves 
to an easy transition to the ‘modern industrial enterprise’. Farms, mines, and 
manufactures were connected to their suppliers and customers by a dense 
network of highly specialised merchants, financiers, insurers, warehousers, 
and shippers. Up to the turn of the century the businesses linking buyers and 
sellers were often larger in terms of assets and employees, better capitalised, 
more likely to be multilocational, and used more advanced accounting 
systems and sophisticated technologies, especially in transport and 
communication, than the production and distribution units they serviced.
The domestic capital markets were immature when compared with 
those in Britain or the USA. Only a minority of companies sought a stock 
exchange listing. The capital markets prime activity before the 1890s was 
trading in speculative mining stock. A market in government securities grew 
slowly before World War I after which the huge volume of war debt 
dominated the market for decades. New issues for industrial stocks remained 
extremely modest until the 1920s and 1930s. Underwriting services were 
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virtually unknown. In short, Australia did not possess a capital market that 
could provide the funds necessary to allow the wholesale rationalisation and 
re-equipping of industries. Technical standards in new science-based 
industries such as plastics were still primitive in the 1930s.33
The emergence of ‘competitive capitalism’ was dampened further by 
the role of government. In Canada tariff policy protected inefficient small and 
medium sized firms in many industries.34  A similar situation existed in 
Australia where producers had only to ask to receive all manner of 
‘protection’. Tariffs were particularly noticeable in Victoria before Federation 
while the new Federal government soon imposed the protectionist Lyne tariff 
in 1908.  By the 1920s manufacturers were sheltered by tariffs while farmers 
received subsidies that took a myriad of forms including pricing many 
government services at less than cost. Government intervention was seen as 
promoting the national interest by allowing Australia to provide employment 
for a larger population in a protected home market. Concern about the size of 
Australia’s population and its ability to defend the huge continental land 
mass became a national obsession in the 1920s and 1930s. Falling commodity 
prices from the mid-1920s weakened the lure of the farm sector to immigrants 
while the national birth rate continued to fall. A protected manufacturing 
sector would offer jobs to new migrants and provide a defence capability. 
This combination of rising tariffs and subsidies taxed the principal export 
industries, wool and minerals, to bring about a transfer of resources into 
lower productivity and city based manufacturing and service industries. 
However, the manner in which assistance was given to favoured industries 
was to have important consequences for the behaviour of Australian 
business. The tariffs given to manufacturing were ‘made to measure’ on an 
industry by industry basis and were set at whatever level was necessary to 
prevent exit by local manufacturers. Workers shared in the rents generated by 
the wedge between domestic and import prices through a centralised wage 
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fixing system operated by the federal government that tied minimum wages 
to price increases. 
Australian business operated in a negotiable environment in which 
competitive pressures were mediated by government intervention and 
regulation. Firms came together in industry associations to negotiate with 
governments and statutory bodies like the Tariff Board. Many industries, 
including interstate shipping, jams, barbed wire, flour and bread, coal, 
brewing, fertilisers, and bricks, had already entered into cartel arrangements 
in regional markets before World War I.35 Co-operation between producers 
strengthened in the absence of any effective legislation that punished the 
abuse of market power.36 Manufacturers shared out sales territories, exercised 
their market power over retailers through exclusive brand agreements, full 
line forcing, and by imposing minimum retail prices. Established firms 
behaved in a predatory fashion against new entrants who would not comply 
with the established norms of collusive behaviour. Business people boldly 
defended their behaviour by asserting that competition was ‘wasteful’. 
Everybody was better off if the incumbents simply shared out the spoils. This 
lack of competitive pressures in many product markets reduced the need for
firms to adopt aggressive strategies driven by new product and process 
technologies to survive.
The small and fragmented nature of the domestic market weakened 
the ability of ‘first movers’ in those industries where plant economies of scale 
existed to acquire significant cost advantages over their rivals. Australia’s 
population rose from just under 4.5 million in 1911 to 6.6 million in 1933 and 
11.6 million by 1966. However, the major markets were spread across six 
capital cities that were roughly 600 miles apart. By 1933 only Sydney and 
Melbourne had populations of one million and the next largest cities around 
300,000. In 1966 both Sydney and Melbourne had grown past two millions 
but no other capital had reached the million mark. High transport costs offset 
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the advantages of large scale production in many industries, especially where 
value was low in relation to volume. Long distance carriage of goods took 
place by sea and rail. Coastal shipping rates reflected collusion and protection 
by the exclusion of non-Australian flag carriers. Nor did rail provide low cost 
transport between states. The lack of a uniform gauge on the main line 
between Sydney and Melbourne increased costs through additional 
transhipment. Long distance road haulage was restricted prior to the 1960s by 
under investment in highways. Some states imposed regulations to curtail the 
use of intra-state road haulage from the 1930s, until such legislation was over 
turned by the courts in the mid-1950s, in an effort to protect the revenue base 
of their railways. 
High transport costs meant that many manufacturing firms in capital 
intensive and science based industries continued to serve regional rather than 
national markets until after World War II. The principal exceptions were in 
the primary metals, chemicals, petroleum refining, and automobile industries 
where production was concentrated in one or two states.  These industries 
were characterised by substantial plant economies of scale which offset 
transportation disabilities and left them better placed to sell nationally. For 
the rest, such as breweries or general engineering, producing in a single city 
meant serving that regional market. 
For many firms the route to becoming a national supplier, or at least 
serving the eastern states, was to invest in production and distribution 
facilities in several cities. While greenfield investments were not uncommon, 
especially by multinational firms, merger and acquisition was a popular 
device for entering new markets, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s.37
However, the extent of merger activity was lessened by the absence of a 
market for corporate control before the 1970s. Permissive company laws 
allowed directors of target companies to refuse bids without disclosure to 
their shareholders. Furthermore, financial institutions would not fund hostile 
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bids. In these circumstances only willing sellers were acquired, and large 
firms took over smaller ones in exchange for cash and shares. The largest 
companies were immune to capital market disciplines.
When mergers did occur it is unclear that operational efficiencies were 
increased as a consequence. The motives for merger were often to eliminate a 
competitor or establish a market presence. While few detailed studies are 
available, the fragments of circumstantial evidence suggest that acquired 
firms were not integrated fully or swiftly into the parent’s operations.38 Many 
post-merger organisations were more akin to British-style confederations of 
loosely aligned and autonomous businesses than the rationalised and 
integrated operations of notable US firms. Australian business people 
possibly lacked the organisational capabilities or the motivation to rationalise 
the increased resources at their disposal.
V
This leads on to the issue of whether Australian firms invested in 
developing corporate capabilities and building integrative hierarchies 
commensurate with the rising scale of big business? Any answer to this 
question is necessarily speculative in the absence of wider firm specific 
research. However, fragmentary evidence suggests that in general Australian 
firms were not particularly capable in this regard.  The evidence from the 
previous section suggests that most firms were largely creatures of their 
external environment.  In section three it was seen that although high 
concentration levels existed in many Australian industries, leading firms 
were small by global standards and therefore may have been less suited to 
investment in organisational capabilities.
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Table 5 about here
Diversification is viewed by Chandler as, “central to the continuing 
evolution of the modern industrial enterprise”.39  It provides economies of 
scope and encourages the development of the organisational capabilities of a 
firm’s resources of production, marketing, personnel, and research. 
Diversification was generally more common among German and American 
than British or Japanese firms: in 1930 18 per cent of the top 200 Japanese 
firms produced more than one distinct line of goods and 21 per cent in Britain 
compared with 59 in America and 67 in Germany (Table 5).  America and 
Germany also dominate the list of highly diversified enterprises with at least 
four distinct product lines.40 Australian firms tended towards British and 
Japanese experience with a lower level of diversification of 26 per cent of the 
top 100 firms in 1930 rising gradually to 36 per cent by 1964.
Integrating stages in the production and distribution process was an 
important avenue of expansion of large scale enterprises, especially in the 
United States and Canada.41  Australian firms in capital intensive and science 
based manufacturing industries were less vertically integrated than was the 
case in other industrial economies. For instance, Broken Hill Proprietary 
Limited began its life as a base metal miner and smelter in the 1880s before 
diversifying into iron and steel production in 1915. By 1935 it had acquired its 
only domestic rival to have achieved a monopoly. Its integration into 
fabricating in the 1920s and 1930s involved the establishment of a number of 
subsidiaries and what were in effect joint ventures with British metal 
fabricators, John Lysaght and Stewart and Lloyds. The other important 
Broken Hill mines, who formed a loose alliance known as the Collins House 
Group, also integrated forward into basic non-ferrous metal production and 
fabricating. However, these vertical links were not achieved by internalisation 
but by a joint venture in the Broken Hill Associated Smelters, and a series of 
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long term contracts with other smelters and joint ventures in a number of 
fabricating firms. Joint ventures rather than vertical integration were common 
in the paper pulp and petrochemical industries. There was limited vertical 
integration in the oil industry as only a few companies had Australian 
refining capacity before the mid-1950s, and as there was no local commercial 
production of crude until the 1970s. Automobile producer General Motors 
Holden manufactured many of its components in house, ‘notably castings, 
brake equipment, shock absorbers and transmission equipment’ but the other 
local automobile producers relied to a much greater degree on external 
suppliers. Automobile producers also franchised their dealerships rather than 
undertaking direct marketing.42.
Few manufacturers integrated forward into distribution, particularly at 
the retail level. Australian retailing was transformed from the late nineteenth 
century by the rise of department stores in the capital cities, and later from 
the 1920s by the emergence of chain variety stores. These large retailers 
integrated backwards into purchasing rather than into manufacturing. 
Traditionally, Australian retailers had relied on large local importers who 
acted as wholesalers of softgoods, ironmongery and so on for their supplies.  
Increasingly, the department stores and later variety chains opened their own 
buying offices overseas. They eliminated the local wholesalers handling 
imported lines and dealt directly with manufacturers abroad.43  They also 
bought directly from local manufactures. Only a handful, such as Foy & 
Gibson, ran manufacturing operations of any significance. Their monopsony 
power gave them leverage over suppliers.
Nor were firms quick to build integrative hierarchies.  Before World 
War 1 many firms, particularly in importing, retailing, and manufacturing, 
were more akin to ‘family capitalism’ than to ‘managerial capitalism’.  
Separation of ownership from control was minimal.  Firms bore family names 
and continued to draw their directors and managers from within the family 
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circle.  There is little evidence of hierarchies of salaried managers outside the 
banks, pastoral companies, or mining houses. There were no educational 
programs to train managers, and the universities and schools of mines 
produced only a limited supply of professional engineers, industrial chemists, 
metallurgists, and the like.44  In the early 1950s a study of the largest 102 
companies in Australia including financial institutions and subsidiaries of 
foreign firms indicated that founding families were in a position to control 
the majority of those companies through their positions on boards and 
through stockholdings. Only a third of domestic companies could be 
identified as management controlled.45  Company histories and biographies 
of business men in the inter war period suggest the absence of any 
sophisticated specialisation of managerial task along functional lines, and the 
lack of a career ladder within organisations. A who’s who of nearly 1,450 
Australian business men published in 1929 indicates that only 30 per cent 
worked as managers, and only nine per cent of those had worked their way 
up through the hierarchy of their present employer. Less than four per cent of 
these salaried managers possessed a university degree.46
There were exceptions, of course, amongst both domestic and foreign 
firms. Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd, the integrated iron and steel producer, 
was run by career managers from its inception. However, this sprawling 
business empire operated in the mid-1930s with a minuscule head office 
staff.47 Likewise the sugar producer, Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd,  
relied heavily on salaried managers with functional skills. By the mid-1950s a 
complex organisation chart was needed to describe its activities and 
functional specialisations. Subsidiaries of foreign multinationals brought their 
parent’s management practices with them. General Motors-Holden was 
staffed by expatriate executives. The British chemical giant ICI had impressed 
its modern organisational structure on its Australian and New Zealand 
business by the early 1950s.48 In Canada foreign ownership and export staples 
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were also important characteristics in the pioneering of corporate 
capabilities.49
Table 6 about here
High survival rates among firms are indicative of their ability to 
exploit organisational capabilities as a source of competitive advantage in 
order to sustain prime mover advantages.  The ability to survive within the 
cohort of leading firms is especially impressive given the rapid and volatile 
rates of economic and political change which have been a feature of the 
twentieth century.  Turnover rates measure the loss of companies from the 
list through relative decline or being acquired by a firm not in the list.  
Among the top 200 Japanese firms average turnover rates varied from 2.9 per 
cent per annum in 1918-30, to 1.7 per cent, 1930-54 and 1954-73.  Using 
Chandler’s data, turnover rates for American, British, and German firms have 
been calculated at between 1.0 and 1.8 per cent per annum (Table 6). By 
comparison, turnover rates among Australian firms appear to have been 
somewhat higher.  This may suggest that Australian enterprise had not 
achieved the settled oligopoly which Chandler views as characteristic of a 
mature corporate economy
Within the last decade or two, however, there appears to have been 
some significant advances in corporate capabilities helped, no doubt, by the 
continued growth in firm size and the adoption of microeconomic reforms 
especially a reduction in protectionism and a strengthening of competition 
policy.  Thus, from 218 public companies, excluding mining, analysed for 
1975, 173 had diversified and most of these had adopted a divisionalised 
structure that reflected products and geographically distinct markets.  A 
study of American and Australian manufacturing companies using 1981 data 
for Australia reinforces the point by indicating that the majority of the largest 
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one hundred Australian manufacturers were diversified and operated a 
divisional structure. Domestic firms were more diversified than subsidiaries 
of foreign multinationals. Those latter firms tended to use a functional 
organisational structure when they produced a single product.50
VI
By using asset data for Australia’s top 100 firms across four selected 
years initial impression are offered about the nature and growth of large scale 
enterprise in modern Australia.  They indicate that although enterprise was 
on a much smaller scale than other high income nations concentration levels 
were high relative to the size of the economy. Comparative advantages drove 
the sectoral distribution of the nation’s leading firms into the resource and 
related service industries.  The central questions for Australian economic and 
business development concern whether comparative largeness generated the 
forms of competitive managerial capitalism and enhanced corporate 
capabilities which Chandler has emphasised for the United States and 
questioned for Britain.  Initial evidence would suggest that Australian firms 
were slow to develop these benefits in an environment dominated by 
negotiation and compromise and where small consumer and capital markets 
constrained the development of economies of scale and a shift into those 
industries which benefited from new technologies. However, these 
conclusions remain speculative until further firm level investigations have 
been pursued. It is hoped that this paper, with its identification of those 
leading companies, will provide a stimulus to such work. 
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TABLE 1
AUSTRALIA: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOP 100 COMPANIES BETWEEN PRIMARY ASIC CLASSIFICATIONS




















% % % % % % % % %
a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1910 9 10 13 13 30 25 9 5 - - 28 37 11 9 - 100 100
1930 6 5 5 4 39 40 10 13 - - 31 30 5 5 4 3 100 100
1952 1 1 9 11 55 58 3 4 - - 27 24 4 2 1 1 100 100
1964 - - 5 5 71 71 2 1 2 1 18 19 2 1 - - 100 100
____________________________________________________________________________________
Source: See text.
